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Abstract
We revisit the analysis of subscription equilibria in a full ﬂedged general equilibrium model
with public goods. We study the case of a non-proﬁt, or public, ﬁrm that produces the public
good using private goods as inputs, which are to be ﬁnanced by voluntary contributions of
households. We analyze policy interventions that will lead to an increase of the public good
level at subscription equilibria, and show that most of the standard neutrality results do not
survive in our general equilibrium model with many private goods and relative price eﬀects
allowed. We also take a direct approach to welfare analysis and study interventions that has
the goal of Pareto improving upon subscription equilibrium outcomes. We delineate conditions
under which, for a generic set of economies, well chosen interventions will Pareto improve upon
a given subscription equilibrium outcome. In particular, we show that a general non-neutrality
result in terms of utilities holds even if all households are contributors.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a series of path-breaking articles that have set forth a deﬁnitive theory of public goods, Samuelson
(1954, 1955, 1958) presented the ﬁrst modern analyses of public goods within a general equilibrium
context. His main concern being the normative one, Samuelson provided a characterization of
welfare optima in public good economies, but he did not elaborate on the process through which
the level of a public good is to be determined. For a complete theory of equilibrium, one has to
specify how the level of a public good is to be determined, and, owing to the distinctive nature
of public goods, this is typically going to be a collective (political) decision-making process that
goes beyond the standard pure market equilibrium notion. Starting with Foley (1967), there have
been various attempts to provide theories of politico-economic equilibrium with public goods in a
general equilibrium context.1 The problem from the view point of economic theory, however, is the
fact that one has to provide precise institutional details of how such collective decisions are to be
made, an area of inquiry that perhaps intersects more with political science than standard economic
theory.
To provide an analysis of the public good problem from pure economic theory point of view, as
well as to serve as a benchmark extension of an analysis of completely decentralized private good
economies to public good economies, a useful starting point is to study which equilibria will be
established in the absence of a central authority or mutual agreement among the agents. Towards
this end, Malinvaud (1972, p. 213) proposed to study the system whereby the public good is
ﬁnanced by subscription, with each household making a contribution to increase the production of
public good. The contributions are to be voluntary and contribution decisions are to be made by
each household independently of other households, the complete autonomy of households thus being
fully respected. Thus, Malinvaud (1972)’s subscription equilibrium is the non-cooperative (Nash)
equilibrium of the game correponding to the economy under consideration, with contribution level
as the action taken by the agents and with their relevant payoﬀ functions appropriately deﬁned.
In this paper we revisit the analysis of subscription equilibria in a full ﬂedged general equilib-
rium model with public goods. We proved existence and regularity of subscription equilibria for
a generic set of economies in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2006). Observing that, as the outcome
of a non-cooperative game, the public good provided at subscription equilibria will typically be
suboptimal, we here analyze policy interventions that will lead to an increase of the public good
level at subscription equilibria (the neutrality results - see discussion below). We also take a direct
approach to welfare analysis and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving upon
subscription equilibrium outcomes.
The subscription equilibrium notion of Malinvaud (1972) is in fact the private (voluntary) con-
tribution equilibrium notion for charitable contributions which has since come to be much studied in
the public economics literature. A vast number of studies have also applied the same notion in other
relevant contexts, such as contributions to election campaigns of political parties, contributions to
activities of special interest groups, behavior of the family members in the economic activities of a
family, contributions to multinational foreign aid packages (e.g. famine relief eﬀort in Somalia).2
However, most of these studies adopt what is essentially a partial equilibrium framework. Moreover,
in cases where the model used has general equilibrium features, it is typically cast with assumptions
that are very restrictive from a genuine general equilibrium analysis point of view.
A brief review of the standard model used to study voluntary contribution equilibria will help
clarify the restrictivenss of its assumptions for a genuine general equilibrium treatment of the
problem.
Using a partial equilibrium model, Warr (1982) showed that the level of public good provided
at the equilibrium of a voluntary contribution game is invariant to (small) redistribution of initial
endowments among an unchanged set of contributors. This invariance property, which has come
to be termed as ”neutrality” property, has an important implication, namely that an exogenous,
1See Milleron (1972) for a survey of general equilibrium models with public goods.
2A vast number of contributions on these issues start with the initial contribution by Olson (1965), and include,
among others, papers by McGuire (1974), Chamberlain (1976), Becker (1981), Young (1982), Warr (1982, 1983),
Brennan and Pincus (1983), Kemp (1984), Roberts (1984), Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), Bernheim (1986),
Cornes and Sandler (1986), and Andreoni (1988).
2tax-ﬁnanced increase in government spending on the public good will reduce voluntary private
spending on the public good by an equal amount, thus perfectly ”crowding out” voluntary private
contributions. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) revisited the neutrality issue using a simple
general equilibrium model with a single private good and a single public good that is produced
through a linear production technology using the private good. One of their results demonstrates the
importance of the assumption that redistribution of income does not change the set of contributing
agents in order to prove the neutrality result in their framework. If the redistribution of income does
change the set of contributing agents and/or alters the total wealth of the current set of contributing
agents, the government provision of a public good will no longer necessarily ”crowd out” private
contributions.
Even though it is cast as a general equilibrium model, the speciﬁc assumptions employed by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1983) in fact render it a partial equilibrium one. In their model,
which is now the canonical model for studying voluntary contribution equilibria, the presence of only
one private good, and the linear production technology for the only public good together imply that
there are no relative prices to be determined in equilibrium (hence its partial equilibrium nature).
The linear coeﬃcient of conversion between the private and the public good is the only possible
equilibrium price in such a setting, a fact which in turn allows normalization of the prices of both
the private and the public good to one without loss of generality. That feature of their model
prevents the possibility of using a powerful channel for intervention, namely the changes in relative
prices.
When more than one private good and a non-linear production technology are allowed, modeling
of how and by whom the public good is produced becomes a crucial preliminary issue to be resolved,
both from the production technology and the market institutional viewpoints.
Regarding the production technology, the linear production technology assumption also allows
taking proﬁts of ﬁrms equal to zero, with the implication that the presence of ﬁrms plays no basic
role in the model. That is to say, given zero proﬁts of the linear technology case, the households can
simply be thought to produce the public good themselves with a constant conversion rate between
the private and the public good. Observe also that with many inputs linearity of a production
function implies constant returns to scale, but the converse will not hold, except for the single
input case. When the production function is linear, and ﬁrms produce a strictly positive quantity
of output, prices are completely determined by the production coeﬃcients. Therefore, equilibrium
p r i c e sc a nb es a i dt ob e“ ﬁxed by the technology”. That is, they change only if technology changes,
and they are not aﬀected by changes in endowments or preferences. Outside the case of linear
production function, equilibrium prices are not ﬁxed by the production technology either in the
case of (generic) constant returns to scale, where ﬁrms’ proﬁts will be zero, or for strictly concave
production technologies with non-zero equilibrium proﬁts.
Regarding the market institutional aspect, if a proﬁt-maximizing (private) ﬁrm is assumed to
produce the public good under non-constant returns to scale technology, then how the (non-zero)
proﬁts of the ﬁrm are apportioned among its shareholders will have an impact on equilibrium
outcomes. An alternative is to consider the production of the public good as being carried out by
an o n - p r o ﬁt, or a public ﬁrm subject to a balanced budget constraint. In that case the amount of
public good to be produced by the non-proﬁt ﬁrm can be taken as the maximum amount that can
be produced with the amount of contributions collected from consumers.
In this paper, we study the case of a non-proﬁt, or public, ﬁrm that produces the public good
using private goods as inputs, which are to be ﬁnanced by voluntary contributions of households.
Thus, by deﬁnition, the ﬁrm producing the public good has no proﬁts, and proﬁt aspect of the
production side of the economy becomes exactly the same as in the standard one private good and
linear production technology for the public good case. We adopt a non-constant returns to scale
production technology to allow for genuine relative price eﬀects.
In our more general framework, the relative price eﬀects, which are absent with a single private
good and under constant returns to scale technology, come to play an important role. Relative
price eﬀects provide a powerful channel through which government interventions can bring about
redistributive wealth eﬀects, which, in turn, change equilibrium outcomes. We show that most of
the standard neutrality results do not survive when more than one private good and genuine relative
3price eﬀects are allowed in a full ﬂedged general equilibrium model. In particular, regarding the
neutrality results of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1983) mentioned above, we show that (a)
there are redistributions of a numeraire good that does not aﬀect contributors’ total wealth but
nevertheless increase the level of public good provided at private provision equilibria; and (b) a
redistribution in favor of contributors is neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition to increase
the level of public good at a private provision equilibria
In our analyses of interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving upon the market outcome,
we study several types of policies, ranging from imposing taxes on ﬁrms and on households, to
directly intervening in the production decisions of the non-proﬁt (public) ﬁrm. In fact, it would
be possible to apply our approach to other forms of intervention to allow a policy maker choose
the one more suitable for the institutional and political environment under consideration. Note
that the type of interventions sought here will coexist along with private provision of public goods.
We delineate conditions under which, for a generic set of economies, a given type of intervention
will Pareto improve upon a given subscription equilibrium outcome. In particular, we show that a
general non-neutrality result in terms of utilities holds even if all households are contributors, which
is the case where the existing neutrality results on the amount of public good produced apply with
full force.
The approach we use to prove our results is based on diﬀerential techniques, which amount to
computing the derivative of the equilibrium values of the “goal function” - the household welfare
levels in this case- with respect to some policy tools - taxes and/or government’s direct provision
of the public good.3
The plan of our paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the set up of our model and the
existence and regularity results proved in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2006). In Section 3, we brieﬂy
discuss non-optimality of equilibria. In Section 4, we present the general strategy used to prove
our main results. In Section 5, we prove results on the possibility of a government intervention
to inﬂuence the total amount of public good through diﬀerent types of intervention. In Section
6, we describe how to increase households’ welfare using two diﬀerent types of interventions: the
ﬁrst one requires the planner to use the available production technology; the second one consists
in taxing prices faced by the ﬁrm. In both interventions, taxes are imposed also on households
(in fact, one contributor4). This further intervention can be avoided; we decided to describe it in
details because it lightens a requirement imposed on the number of households and because taxing
households seems quite a natural kind of intervention.5
2 Set-up of the Model and Preliminary Results
We consider a general equilibrium model with private provision of a public good. There are C,
C ≥ 1, private commodities, labelled by c =1 ,2,...,C.T h e r ea r eH households, H>1, labelled
by h =1 ,2,...,H.L e t H = {1,...,H} denote the set of households. Let xc
h denote consumption
of private commodity c by household h; ec
h embodies similar notation for the endowment in private
goods.
The following standard notation is also used:
• xh ≡ (xc
h)C
c=1, x ≡ (xh)H
h=1 ∈ RCH
++.
• eh ≡ (ec
h)C
c=1, e ≡ (eh)H
h=1 ∈ RCH
++.
• pc is the price of private good c. Prices are expressed in units of the numeraire good C,w h o s e
price is therefore normalized to 1.D e ﬁne , p\ ≡ (pc)
C−1





3Therefore, all our arguments are “local” in their nature. We also note that, since price eﬀects may in principle
go in any direction, all our non-neutrality results hold only typically in the relevant space of economies.
4Recall that, given our assumptions, in each equilibrium at least one consumer is a contributor, and in fact each
consumer may be a contributor.
5A more detailed version of the paper, containing even the most elementary proofs, is available upon request from
the authors.
4• gh ∈ R+ is the amount of resources (measured in units of the numeraire good) that consumer




h=1 gh,a n dG\h ≡ G − gh.
• yg is the amount of public good produced in the economy.
The preferences over the private goods and the public good of household h are represented by
a utility function
uh : RC
++ × R++ → R,u h :( xh,yg) 7→ uh (xh,yg)
Assumption 1 uh(xh,yg) is a smooth, diﬀerentiably strictly increasing (i.e., for every (xh,yg) ∈
R
C+1
++ , Duh(xh,yg) À 0)6, diﬀerentiably strictly quasi-concave function (i.e.,∀(xh,yg) ∈
R
C+1
++ ,∀v ∈ RC+1\{0},i f Duh (xh,yg)v =0 ,t h e nvD2uh (xh,yg)v<0)a n df o re a c hu ∈ R




++ : uh (xh,yg) ≥ u
ª
is contained in R
C+1
++ .
Let U be the set of utility functions uh satisfying Assumption 1.
The production technology available to produce the public good is described by the following
production function.
f : RC
++ → R++,f : y 7−→ f (y)
Assumption 2 f is C2,d i ﬀerentiably strictly increasing, diﬀerentiably strictly concave (i.e., ∀y ∈
RC
++, D2f is negative deﬁnite), and ∀f ∈ R++, clRC{y ∈ RC
++ : f(y) ≥ f} ⊆ RC
++.
Let F be the set of production functions f satisfying Assumption 2.
The government collects resources from the contributors, and maximizes the production of public
goods, given the constraint to balance the budget, i.e., it solves the following problem. For given
p\ ∈ R
C−1
++ and G ∈ R++,
maxy∈RC
++ f (y) s.t −py + G =0 ( α) (1)
with G =
P
h gh and where we follow the convention of writing associated Lagrange or Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers next to the constraint.
For given p\ ∈ R
C−1
++ and G ∈ R++ a solution to problem (1) is characterized by Lagrange
conditions.
Deﬁne
b f : R
C−1




































=a r gm a x (1).
Household’s problem is the following one. For given p\ ∈ R
C−1









s.t. −pxh + peh − gh =0
gh ≥ 0
Equivalently, we can write the household’s problem as follows. For given p\ ∈ R
C−1








h) s.t. −pxh + peh − gh ≥ 0 λh
gh ≥ 0 μh
−y
g






Observe that in the latter formulation, in equilibrium it must be the case that for every h, y
g
h = yg.
6For vectors y,z, y ≥ z (resp. y À z) means every element of y is not smaller (resp. strictly larger) than the
correponding element of z; y>zmeans that y ≥ z but y 6= z.
5Remark 2 For given p\ ∈ R
C−1
++ ,G \h ∈ R+,e h ∈ RC
++, a solution to problem (2) is characterized
by Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Deﬁnition 3 An economy is an element π ≡ (e,u,f) in Π ≡ RCH
++ ×UH ×F.
Deﬁnition 4 Av e c t o r(y,x,yg,g,p \) is an equilibrium for an economy π ∈ Π if:







2. households maximize, i.e., for each h,(xh,y
g





R+,e h ∈ RC
++; and


















++ and y\ ≡ (yc)c6=C ∈ RC−1.7
In the remainder of the paper we are going to use two equivalent equilibrium systems. System
(3) below simply lists Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the agent’s maximization problems and market




++ × R++×R++ ×
¡
RC
++ × R++ × R++ × R++ × R
¢H













F1 : Ξ0 × RCH
++ → RdimΞ0
,F 1 :( ξ0,π) 7→ left hand side of (3) below




(3) yg − f (y)= 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh,y
g
h) − λhp =0
(h.2) Dyguh (xh,y
g
h) − ηh =0





(h.4) −pxh + peh − gh =0
(h.5) −y
g
















Note that in the above system we in fact have






h for all h (4)
w h e r ew eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition of b f and equations (1) and (2) in the above system.
Observe that (y,x,yg,g,p \)is an equilibrium associated with an economy π if and only if there








=0 . With innocuous abuse
of terminology, we will call ξ0an equilibrium.
Using an homotopy argument, in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2006), we show the following result.
7Clearly, the Walras’ law applies in this model.
6Theorem 5 For every economy π ∈ Π, an equilibrium exists.
We now introduce the equilibrium system we use to show the results of the present paper.
Lemma 6 For every e ∈ RCH
++, ξ0 is a solution to system (3) if and only if it is a solution to the
following system




(3) yg − f (y)= 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh,yg) − λhp =0
(h.30) αDyguh (xh,yg) − λh + μh =0
(h.4) −pxh + peh − gh =0












h + yg =0
(h.60) αηh − λh + μh =0
(5)
Proof. The proof follows from the comparison of systems (3) and (5), and from Remark 1.
Since ηh appears only in equation (h.60) and it is uniquely determined by that equation, and y
g
h
appears only in equation (h.50) and it is uniquely determined by that equation,we can erase those
variables and equations and get the following basically equivalent system.




(3) yg − f (y)= 0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh,yg) − λhp =0
(h.2) αDyguh (xh,yg) − λh + μh =0
(h.3) −pxh + peh − gh =0












e Ξ ≡ RC
++ × R++×R++ ×
¡
RC
++ × R++ × R
¢H













F2 : e Ξ × RCH




7→ left hand side of system (6)
We can now prove that there is a large set of the endowments (the so-called regular economies) for
which associated equilibria are ﬁnite in number, and that equilibria change smoothly with respect
to endowments - see Theorem 8 below. To do this, we need to restrict the set of utility functions
adding the following assumptions
Assumption 3. ∀h, uh is diﬀerentiably strictly concave, i.e., ∀(xh,G) ∈ R
C+1
++ , D2uh (xh) is
negative deﬁnite.





Dxhxhuh (xh,yg)[ Dxhuh (xh,yg)]
T
Dygxhuh (xh,yg) Dyguh (xh,yg)
¸
6=0
7Remark 7 I nt h ec a s eo fh o u s e h o l dh being a contributor (and therefore μh being equal to zero)





which is what we need in the proof of some of our result.
Assumption 4 has an easy and appealing economic interpretation. It is easy to see that it is
implied by the public good being a normal good, providing the household is a contributor.
Call e U the subset of U whose elements satisfy Assumptions 3 and 4. Deﬁne
pr : F
−1
2 (0) → RCH
++,p r :( ξ,e) 7→ e
We can state the needed generic regularity result.
Theorem 8 For each (u,f) ∈ e U×F, there exists an open and full measure subset R of RCH
++ such
that








2. ∀h ∈ H,e i t h e rgh > 0 or μh > 0
3. there exist an open neighborhood Y of e in RCH





2 (0) such that Uj ∩Uk = ∅ if j 6= k, pr−1 (Y )=∪r
i=1Ui and pr|Ui : Ui → Y is a
diﬀeomorphism.
3 Non-optimality of Subscription Equilibria
It is well known that typically subscription equilibria are not Pareto optimal. That result is also a
corollary of the theorems in Section 5.
A large part of the literature studied one private good, linear technology models and tried to
propose policy interventions aimed at increasing the equilibrium level of G, whose underprovision
was implicitly considered the main reason of ineﬃciency.
In Section 5, we address that problem and in our more general framework, we conﬁrm some
existing results and we show that some others do not generalize. All policy interventions that have
been studied require a reduction in some household’s wealth. That negative eﬀect on her equilibrium
utility level is to be balanced with the positive eﬀect due to an increase in G,t h et o t a le ﬀect being
unclear. In fact, we show the total eﬀect can lead to a decrease in that household utility level.
Building up on that simple observation, we take a direct approach to welfare analysis and
describe interventions that are able to Pareto improve upon subscription equilibrium outcomes.
In the remainder of the paper, we ﬁrst lay out a general strategy to deal with some policy
questions in a general equilibrium model. Then, we apply that strategy to the policy interventions
referred to above.
We prove in some detail the result for the technically easiest case - a redistribution from non-
contributors to contributors in order to increase G. Other proofs are the same in spirit and involve
very similar arguments.
4 A General Methodology
Our starting point is the equilibrium function F2 deﬁned using system (6). We then proceed in four
steps.8
8We apply the general approach introduced by Geneakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), using the strategy laid
out by Cass and Citanna (1998) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998).
8Step (i):
We ﬁrst deﬁne a new equilibrium function
F3 : Ξ × RT × e Π → RdimΞ, :( ξ,θ,π) 7→ F3 (ξ,θ,π)
taking into account the planner’s intervention eﬀects on agents behaviors via the policy tools θ ∈ RT.
We then deﬁne a function F4, describing the constraints on the planner intervention
F4 : Ξ × RT × e Π → Rk, :( ξ,θ,π) 7→ F4 (ξ,θ,π)
and then we consider the function
e F ≡ (F3,F 4)
whose zeros can be naturally interpreted as equilibria with planner’s intervention. We can partition
the vector θ of tools into two subvectors θ1 ∈ RT1 and θ1 ∈ RT2. The former can be seen as the
vector of independent tools and the latter as the vector of dependent tools: once the value of the
ﬁrst vector is chosen, the value of the second one is uniquely determined.9 We ﬁnd a value θ1
(and associated θ2) at which equilibria with and without planner’s intervention coincide (that value




We ﬁnally introduce a goal function G deﬁned as
G : Ξ × RT × e Π → RJ, :( ξ,θ,π) 7→ G (ξ,θ,π)
The object of our analysis is to study the local eﬀect of a change in the values of independent
tools θ1, around the no-intervention value θ1,o nG when its arguments assume their equilibrium
(with planner intervention) values.
Step (ii):
We construct the function linking (independent) tools to goals. An important step towards that
construction is provided verifying the following condition.
Condition 9 For each (u,f) ∈ e U×F, there exists an open and full measure subset R of RCH
++









has full row rank dimΞ + T2 (7)
If the above condition is satisﬁed, there exists an open and dense subset Π∗ of e Π such that
for each π ∈ Π∗, condition (7) holds. Then as a consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem,
∀π ∈ Π∗ and ∀ξ such that F2 (ξ,π)=0 ,t h e r ee x i s ta no p e ns e tV ⊆ RT1 containing θ1 and a unique














In words, the function h(ξ,π) describes the eﬀects of local changes of θ1 around θ1 on the equilibrium
values of ξ and θ2.
For every economy π ∈ Π∗, and every ξ ∈ F−1
π (0),w ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne, as desired,




In what follows, unless explicitly needed, we will omit the subscript (ξ,π) of the function g.
Step (iii):
Using the function g above, we give a suﬃcient condition which guarantees that changes in the
values of policy tools have a non-trivial eﬀect on the values of the goals.
Technically, this amounts to showing that there exists an open and dense subset Π∗∗ ⊆ e Π such
that for each π ∈ Π∗∗ and for each associated equilibrium ξ, the planner can “move” the equilibrium
9In our proposed diﬀerent types of intervention, we will have k = T2, i.e., the number of constraints imposed on
the planner’s behavior is equal to the number of dependent tools.




, the value of the goal function in
t h ec a s eo fn oi n t e r v e n t i o n .M o r ef o r m a l l y ,w en e e dt os h o wt h a tg is essentially surjective at θ
∗
,














Therefore, recalling the distinction between dependent and independent tools above, we must have
J = # goals ≤ # independent tools = T1
Step (iv):
We want to show that the statement (8) holds in an open and dense subset Π∗∗ of e Π.F o l l o w i n g
Cass (1992), a suﬃcient condition for that is to show that for each π ∈ Π∗∗ the following system













=0 ( 2 )
cc − 1= 0 ( 3 )
(9)
Openness of Π∗∗. It follows from the properness of the projection function from the equilibrium set
(in fact, manifold) to the parameter space.
Density of Π∗∗.D e ﬁne the function
F∗ : Ξ × RdimΞ+T2+k × e Π → RdimΞ × RdimΞ++T2+k × R
F∗ :( ξ,c,π) 7→ left hand side of system (9)
As an application of a ﬁnite dimensional version of Parametric Transversality Theorem, the dense-
ness result is established by showing that 0 is a regular value for F∗. More precisely, since π is an
element of the inﬁnite dimensional set e Π,w ec h o o s et ol o o ka taﬁnite dimensional subset (submani-
fold) of that set parametrized by a vector a, taking advantage of the generic regularity of equilibria.
The construction of the parametrization used is as follows.
We use a ﬁnite local parameterization of both the utility and the transformation functions.11
For the former, we are going to use the following form:
uh (xh,g h)=uh (xh,g h)+( ( xh,g h) − (x∗
h,g∗
h))









where uh ∈ e Uh, (x∗
h,g∗
h) are equilibrium values, Axx,h is a symmetric negative deﬁnite matrix,
and agg,h is a strictly negative number. Same second order local parameterization is used for the
production function, using a symmetric negative deﬁnite matrix Af.






,w h e r e(ah,a gg,h) and b af are the vectors of distinct
elements of the symmetric matrices Ah,f o rh =1 ,...,H,a n d b Af,.
We then redeﬁne the functions F2, e F, G,a n dF∗ by replacing e U×Fin their domain with a open
ball b A in a ﬁnite Euclidean space with generic element a.C a l lFA, e FA, GA,a n dF∗
A the functions
so obtained. We can then rewrite (9) as F∗













=0 ( 2 )
cc − 1= 0 ( 3 )
(10)
10See, for example, Chapter 1 in Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973).
11For further details on the content of this appendix, see Cass and Citanna (1998) and Citanna, Kaji and Villanacci
(1998).
10We are then left with showing that 0 is a regular value for F∗
A, i.e., either
F∗
A (ξ,e,a)=0has no solutions (ξ,c)
for all values of (e,a) in an open and dense subset of RCH
++ × b A
(11)
or, using generic regularity, that
for each (ξ,c,e,a) ∈ (F∗
A)












where Na (c) is the partial Jacobian of the left hand side of equations (2) and (3) in system (10)
with respect to a.
In what follows, we apply the strategy described in the previous section. We ﬁrst describe in
words the type of intervention and then we indicate the speciﬁcf o r mo ft h ef u n c t i o n sF3,F 4 and G
consistent with that intervention. We ﬁnally state the theorem on the essential surjectivity of the
corresponding function g. To keep notation as light as possible, we use the same notation about
the above functions and related sets in each section.
5 Government Intervention on the Public Good Level
5.1 Redistributing among contributors
The following theorem is a restatement of a theorem by BBV for the case of many private goods,
and its proof is a straight forward adaptation of their proof.
Theorem 10 Consider an equilibrium associated with an arbitrary economy and a redistribution
of the private numeraire good among contributing households such that no household loses more
wealth than her original contribution. All the equilibria after the redistribution are such that the
consumption of private goods and the total amount of consumed public good are the same as before
the redistribution.
As a simple Corollary to Theorem 10, we get the following:
Proposition 11 The set of equilibria after a local redistribution from an arbitrary set of non-
contributors to one contributor is equal to the set of equilibria after a local redistribution from that
same arbitrary set of non-contributors to an arbitrary set of contributors.
This result follows from the fact that each equilibrium with only 1 contributor being subsidized
can be obtained from each equilibrium with more than one contributor being subsidized using
appropriate redistributions among contributors. Making use of this result, we consider taxes or
subsidies on only one contributor in all of the diﬀerent types of planner interventions we study
below.
We now look at the case in which the planner redistributes endowments of one private good
between a (strictly) contributing household, say h =1 , and one or two (strictly) non-contributing
household, say h =2 ,4.12
5.2 Redistributing between a contributor and a non-contributor
The planner redistributes resources between a contributor and a non-contributor in order to increase
the total production of public good. Therefore, she taxes household 1 and 2 by an amount ρ1 and
ρ2 respectively. Household h ∈ {1,2}’s budget constraint becomes:
−p(xh − eh) − gh − ρh =0 (13)
12It can be easily shown that the set of economies for which there exists at least one or two non-contributors is
open (and non-empty).
11The balanced budget constraint requires
ρ1 + ρ2 =0
Note that # goals =1,#c o n s t r a i n t s=1,t o o l sa r eρ1,ρ 2 and thus # tools = 2.
Therefore
F3 : Ξ × R2 × Π → RdimΞ, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ LHS of (6) with eqn.(h.3) replaced by (13), h ∈ {1,2}
F2 : Ξ × R2 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ ρ1 + ρ2
G : Ξ × R2 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→
PH
h=1 gh
Theorem 12 T h e r ee x i s t sa no p e na n dd e n s es u b s e tS∗ of the set of the economies for which
there exists at least one non-contributor, such that ∀π ∈ S∗
1 and ∀ξ0 ∈ F−1
π (0) the function g
is essentially surjective at 0, i.e.,there exists a redistribution of the endowments of private good C
between one contributor and one non-contributor which increases (or decreases) the level of provided
public good.13
5.3 Redistributing between non-contributors
The planner redistributes resources between a contributor and a non-contributor in order to increase
the total production of public good.
Theorem 13 If C ≥ 2, for an open and dense subset S∗ of the set of (the economies for which there
exist at least two non-contributors, at any equilibrium ξ0,t h ef u n c t i o ng is essentially surjective at
0, i.e., there exist taxes on two non-contributors which increases (or decreases) the level of provided
public good.
The requirement C ≥ 2 in the theorem brings out the importance of having more than one
private good in obtaining non-neutrality results in our analysis. To see why having more than one
private good is essential to aﬀect relative price changes, consider the case of one public and one
private good. Redistributing the private good among non-contributors will not change the demand
of the public good because contributors are not aﬀected by this intervention and non-contributors
do not become contributors (because, generically, we are not on the border line cases and taxes
are small). Therefore, there will also be no change in the overall the demand for the single private
good. With no other private good available, the overall eﬀect is just a reallocation of the demand
for the private good from a non-contributor to another.
5.4 Taxing one contributor and two non-contributors
In this subsection,we show that we can take away some amount of the numeraire good from the
contributor (tax her positively) and still increase the amount of G.
We consider the case in which the planner redistributes endowments of one private good among
three households, say h =1 ,2 and 4, where household 1 is a contributor and the other two are
non-contributors.
Therefore
F3 : Ξ × R3 × Π → RdimΞ, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ LHS of (6) with eqn.(h.3) replaced by (13), h ∈ {1,2,4}
F4 : Ξ × R3 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→
P
h=1,2,4 ρh






Note that # goals =2,#c o n s t r a i n t s=1,t o o l sa r eρ1,ρ 2,ρ 4 and thus # tools = 3.
13This result is in fact a Corollary ot Theorem 14 below.
12Theorem 14 If C ≥ 2, for an open and dense subset S∗ of the set Π of the economies for which
there exists at least two non-contributors, at any equilibrium ξ0, the function b ga is locally onto
around 0.
In more intuitive terms, the theorem says that, typically in the relevant set of economies, there
exists a redistribution of the endowments of private good C among one contributor and two non-
contributors such that
the contributor may be taxed, or subsidized or neither of the two, and, in a completely unrelated
manner,
the level of provided public good may be increased or decreased or left constant.
In other words, the planner can choose arbitrarily the signs of changes (negative, positive or
zero) of both ρ1 and G and then ﬁnd a value of (ρ2,ρ 4) in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of zero
which induces those desired sign changes.
5.5 Dealing with wealth of all contributors: Taxing one contributor and
two non-contributors
In this subsection, we want to increase the equilibrium level of G, even penalizing contributors,
this time not in term of a negative tax, but in terms of a negative change in their total wealth.
Therefore, we have
F3 : Ξ × R2 × Π → RdimΞ, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ LHS of (6) with eqn.(h.3) replaced by (13), h ∈ {1,2,4}
F4 : Ξ × R2 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→
P
h=1,2,4 ρh
G : Ξ × R2 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→
³P




Theorem 15 F o ra no p e na n dd e n s es u b s e tS∗ of the set Π of the economies for which there exists
at least two non-contributors, at any equilibrium ξ0, the function b ga is locally onto around 0.
The above result is similar to the result in Theorem 14, the other goal of the intervention
beside G,b e i n gtotal wealth of contributors instead of the level of taxes on a contributor. In other
words, the planner can choose arbitrarily the signs of changes (negative, positive or zero) of both
total wealth of contributors and G and then ﬁnd a value of (ρ1,ρ 2,ρ 4) in an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of zero which induces those desired sign changes.
5.6 Increasing G and Pareto improving
It is easy to prove that an increase in the total equilibrium level of G does not imply a Pareto
improvement. To do so, consider as F3 and F4 the same functions as in the previous subsection and
G as follows






Theorem 16 F o ra no p e na n dd e n s es u b s e tS∗ of the set Π of the economies for which there exists
at least two non-contributors, at any equilibrium ξ0, the function g is locally onto around 0, i.e., the
total level of the public good may increase without leading to a Pareto superior equilibrium outcome.
6 Government Interventions on Welfare
6.1 Intervening in ﬁrm production
The planner taxes one contributor and changes the choice of inputs and output of the production
of the public good. The idea is that the manager of the public ﬁrm chooses y to solve problem (1)
and then the ministry of Public Economics, i.e., the planner, decides to use some extra inputs θy
to produce extra public good ﬁnancing it with taxes ρ1 on household 1 who is a contributor.
13The constraint on planner intervention is simply
ρ1 − pθy =0
In this case, # goals = H,#c o n s t r a i n t s=1,t o o l s :ρ1,θ y whose number is 1+C. Therefore,
we must have H ≤ C. In fact, for technical reasons, we need to impose H ≤ C − 1.
Deﬁne ρ ≡ (ρ1,θ y) ∈ RC=1 and
F3 : Ξ × RC+1 × Π → RdimΞ, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ LHS of (6) with eqn.(h.3) replaced by (13), h ∈ {1,2,4}
F4 : Ξ × RC+1 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ ρ1 − pθy
G : Ξ × RC+1 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ,π) 7→ (uh (xh))
H
h=1
Theorem 17 Assume that H ≤ C−1. For an open and dense subset S∗
1 of the set of the economies,
at any equilibrium ξ0,t h ef u n c t i o ng is essentially surjective at 0, i.e., there exists a tax on a con-
tributor and a choice of change in inputs θy which Pareto improves or impairs upon the equilibrium
ξ0.
6.2 Communicating non-market prices to the manager
The planner tells the manager of the public ﬁrm to maximize the amount of produced public good
at prices (1 − σc)pcunder the constraint of not spending more than
P
h gh. Of course if, just to ﬁx
ideas, σc > 0 for each c, the manager is not spending
PC
c=1 (1 − σc)pcyc, but the higher amount
PC
c=1 pcyc.T h ed i ﬀerence
PC
c=1 σcpcyc has to be ﬁnanced by taxes ρ1 .
The basic idea of all the intervention is of course that market prices are not the ”right ones”.
The intervention is in sense the most direct one: change the prices at which public good is produced.
1. Public ﬁrm solves
maxy∈RC
++ f (y) s.t. −
PC
c=1 (1 − σc)pcyc + G =0 (14)






3. Household 1’s budget constraint becomes:
−p(x1 − e1) − g1 − ρ1 =0






and thus # tools = C +1.
Therefore, we must have H ≤ C. As in the case of the previous subsection, we have in fact to
impose that H ≤ C − 1
Then the system with planner intervention is
(1) Df (y) − α((1 − σc)pc)
C
c=1 =0
(2) −((1 − σc)pc)
C
c=1 · y +
P
h gh =0
(h.1) Dxhuh (xh,yg) − λhp =0
(h.2) αDyguh (xh,yg) − λh + μh =0











(P1) yg − f (y)= 0
(16)
with ρh =0if and only if h 6=1 .
Deﬁne and
14F3 : Ξ × RC+1 × Π → RdimΞ, (ξ,ρ1,σ,π) 7→ LHS of (16)
F4 : Ξ × RC+1 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ1,σ,π) 7→ ρ1 − pθy
G : Ξ × RC+1 × Π → R, (ξ,ρ1,σ,π) 7→ (uh (xh))
H
h=1
Theorem 18 Assume that H ≤ C−1. For an open and dense subset S∗ of the set of the economies,
at any equilibrium ξ0, the function g is essentially surjective at 0, i.e., there exists a tax on a
contributor and a choice of change in input prices σ w h i c hP a r e t oi m p r o v e so ri m p a i r su p o nt h e
equilibrium ξ0.
7 Appendix. The proof of Theorem 12
Condition 9 in Subsection 4 can be easily veriﬁed, exploiting generic regularity.









rank, showing that system (9) has no solutions is equivalent to showing that the following system
has no solutions ⎧
⎨
⎩





=0 ( 2 )

























.W ea r et h e r e f o r el e f tw i t hs h o w i n gt h a t
form of those conditions.








a r el i s t e di nt h eﬁrst
column, the variables with respect to which derivatives are taken are listed in the ﬁrst row, and in
the remaining bottom right corner the corresponding partial Jacobian is displayed.










































































16Performing some elementary row and column operations and erasing some irrelevant rows and

































































Then to check that condition 11 ( in terms of Γ) holds, it is enough to check that the following
system has no solutions.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩






(2) −pcy + Dygu1 · cg1 =0






(1.2) −cλ1 + cG =0
(1.3) −pcx1 − cg1 =0
















(P1) Dx1ygu1 · cx1 + αDygygu1 · cg1 + .. + Dx2ygu2 · cx2 − cyg =0
(G1) −cλ1 + cρ1 =0
(G2) −cλ2 + cρ1 =0
(L) cc − 1= 0
To show that condition (12) (in terms of Γ) holds we have to check that the following matrix
M has full rank.
17⎡


























cy cα cx1 cg1 cλ1 cx2 cλ2 c
p\ cyg cρ1 cG
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
which can be done through some cumbersome computations.
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